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Abstract—Effective monitoring is essential for the security of
cloud systems. Although many monitoring tools exist in the cloud
domain, there is little guidance on how to deploy monitors to
make the most of collected monitor data and increase the like-
lihood of detecting breaches of security. We introduce an actor-
centric, asset-based monitor deployment model for the cloud that
enables practitioners to reason about monitor deployment in
terms of the security of the cloud assets that they own. We define
an actor model that consolidates several roles in the literature to
three roles that are motivated by security. We then develop an
architectural model that identifies the assets that can be owned by
each of those actors, and use it to drive an asset-based cloud threat
model. Using our threat model, we claim that a cloud practitioner
can reason about monitor deployment to more efficiently deploy
monitors and increase its chances of detecting intrusions. We
demonstrate the utility of our model with a cloud scenario based
on Netflix’s use of Amazon Web Services.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing provides consumers with storage and
computation services that can scale and are charged according
to demand. However, cloud computing also introduces unique
security risks, because the cloud is a shared computational
resource that is owned and maintained by a variety of actors.
According to a recent survey of cloud practitioners conducted
by Intel, despite continuing progress in cloud computing
security, 57% of respondents marked the inability to measure
security services as one of their top three security concerns
with cloud computing [1]. Effective monitor deployment is a
must to effectively detect security breaches in a cloud system
and allow cloud consumers to be confident in the security of
the cloud system on which their data and services reside.
Therefore, we explain the motivation behind, formalize,
and illustrate the application of a monitor deployment model
for the cloud. Our intent is for cloud practitioners to use our
model to reason about monitor deployment over the lifetime
of a cloud service. One requirement is to enable practitioners
to detect breaches of security for cloud assets that span
organizational boundaries.
Our monitor deployment model is actor-centric and asset-
based because it incorporates both a set of actors and a generic
architecture model. In addition, our threat model is specific to
the cloud and allows us to reason about the impact of threats
at multiple architectural layers.
We explain the motivation for our research in the context
of the limitations of existing approaches to cloud monitoring
deployment and threat modeling. Existing approaches to cloud
monitoring deployment are either general but too high-level to
give practical advice on how to deploy a monitoring system, or
provide practical advice on how to deploy a monitoring system,
but only in very specific scenarios. Furthermore, existing
approaches to threat modeling in the cloud may provide a high-
level overview of threats, but do not provide practitioners with
practical insights on which threats are relevant to them or their
assets.
In contrast, our approach uses a simple actor model to
express threats relative to the cloud assets owned by each
actor. Our intended research contribution is to address gaps
in cloud threat modeling to improve cloud monitoring. Thus,
practitioners will be able to determine where they need to place
monitors (or even potentially cooperate with one another) in
order to mitigate a security threat.
The design and formalization of our framework were
inspired by the layer-based approach to cloud monitoring taken
by Spring in [2] and [3] and by the understanding that cloud
monitors must monitor either the behavior of assets in the
cloud or the communication interface between assets.
Our intent is to provide a general framework that practition-
ers can use to perform an analysis of their set of cloud assets
and deploy monitors to detect security breaches. We design
an approach that is both actor-centric and asset-based and is
driven by the threats to the assets. We identify a set of roles in
cloud scenarios so that practitioners in those roles may easily
evaluate security threats relative to their own cloud assets. We
also identify the set of assets upon which monitors can be
deployed and the threats relevant to each asset. The intent
of our monitor deployment model is to identify threats in a
manner that accommodates a variety of different technologies
used to implement cloud services.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II explains the motivation for a threat model that is
specific to cloud computing, as well as the need to reason about
the impact and relevance of the included threats. Section III
defines the three components of our approach—the actor
model, architecture model, and threat model—and describes
how we developed an approach to monitor deployment in the
cloud using these components. In Section IV, we describe
how we apply our model to analyze security-driven monitor
deployment in an artificial but realistic cloud architecture
based upon Netflix’s use of Amazon Web Services. Section V
discusses future work. We conclude in Section VI.
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II. MOTIVATION
As organizations increasingly migrate their services to the
cloud to leverage economies of scale, these organizations
also increase their services’ attack surface. The intent of our
ongoing research is to use monitor deployment, driven by a
set of threats to a particular actor’s cloud resources, as a tool
to improve the security of the cloud. We now explain how our
research responds to the limitations of monitor deployment and
threat modeling in the context of the cloud.
A. Cloud Monitor Deployment
Our research addresses a gap that we see in the current
cloud monitoring literature. We claim that the current literature
provides either (1) a general, high-level discussion of cloud
monitoring that does not help practitioners implement monitor
deployment in specific instances, or (2) practical implementa-
tion advice that is limited to specific cloud scenarios and is
not generally applicable.
High-Level Cloud Monitor Deployment: Existing research does
provide high-level analysis of where to deploy monitors within
the cloud. For example, Spring [2] uses the 7 layers of cloud
computing defined by the Cloud Security Alliance to organize
monitor placement. Although the paper provides a good list of
considerations and best practices for deploying monitors and
access control mechanisms to secure cloud offerings, several
practical monitoring issues fall outside its scope. For example,
the paper neglects actors other than cloud providers that also
use a cloud. As a result, the paper cannot be applied to multi-
level scenarios, such as those in which a Software-as-a-Service
(SaaS) provider does not actually own the cloud infrastructure.
In addition, several surveys provide overviews of the state-
of-the-art in cloud monitoring. For example, Aceto et al.
explain cloud monitoring and provide an extensive survey of
the current state-of-the-art of comprehensive cloud monitoring
systems [4]. They identify a set of desired properties for
monitoring systems that focus primarily on performance and
quality of service and evaluate different commercially available
cloud monitoring software services and platforms using these
properties. The properties Aceto et al. use, however, do not
translate easily to desired security properties, which makes
their evaluation less useful for monitor deployment for intru-
sion detection. Furthermore, their analysis is top-down and
looks only at complete monitoring systems; no consideration
is given to constructing good monitoring systems using indi-
vidual monitors or combinations of monitors and monitoring
systems. Our proposed approach provides a bottom-up method
for deploying monitors within and around an actor’s cloud
assets to increase the utility of the monitors in detecting
security breaches.
Monitoring Approaches for Specific Cloud Scenarios: In con-
trast, a number of approaches have been proposed for cloud
monitoring in very specific scenarios. Clayman et al. propose a
new monitoring framework for RESERVOIR federated service
clouds [5]. Khandelwal et al. use a set of indirect information
to attempt to monitor network health information in Amazon
EC2 infrastructure clouds [6]. Gonza´lez et al. propose a spe-
cific monitoring architecture for dynamic security monitoring
in virtualized environments [7]. While those approaches may
have some merit in the specific scenarios they address, they
are not generally applicable.
B. Threat Modeling in the Cloud
Practitioners need to be able to model threats in the cloud.
Our ongoing research addresses a gap in threat modeling for
the cloud: the lack of a practical way for cloud practitioners
to evaluate the threats that are relevant to their assets. This is
important because understanding where to deploy monitors in
the cloud to maximize the probability of detecting intrusions
requires a detailed understanding of how general security
issues and threats relate to the specific assets one owns and
needs to protect. As with cloud monitoring, many of the cloud-
based threat models are useful, but somewhat high-level. In
addition, to the best of our knowledge, there is no cloud-based
threat model that clearly associates security issues with the
parties they affect.
A variety of organizations and governmental agencies have
come out with their own high-level evaluations of threats
to cloud computing and recommendations to mitigate these
threats (see reports by ENISA [8], Gartner [9], and NIST [10]).
Much of the work in the area has been done by the Cloud
Security Alliance (CSA) in their “Security Guidance” [11]
and “Top Threats to Cloud Computing” [12] publications.
Although the CSA and others classify threats in terms of
different cloud security models, they do not give practitioners
an easy way to understand which threats affect the specific
assets that they own or depend upon.
Finally, although many researchers have surveyed security
threats within cloud computing, they have not yet expressed
these threats in terms of how individual practitioners, or actors,
are affected. Subashini and Kavitha survey security issues and
relate them to each of the three prominent service models
(IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS) [13]. Modi et al. identify security issues
and mechanisms to mitigate them in terms of 7 layers in cloud
computing that they developed [14]. However, neither of these
papers provides a clear way to map the cloud assets owned by
different actors to the service models or layers, which makes it
difficult to associate security issues with the parties they affect.
III. CLOUD MONITOR DEPLOYMENT MODEL
We approach monitor deployment in the cloud from an
actor-centric and asset-based perspective.
A. Cloud Actor Model
We distill the roles defined in the literature into the follow-
ing three primary roles [4], [15].
• Cloud provider (CP): Provider and owner of the physical
infrastructure. The service provided by the CP may be
infrastructure (as in the case of EC2), platform (as in the
case of Azure or AppEngine), or even software (as in the
case of SalesForce), so long as the CP does not actually
own the data or computation that is run through its cloud
offering.
• Cloud service provider (CSP): User of a cloud provider,
but also a provider of a service offering to consumers. The
hallmark of a CSP is that it is not the sole end-user of the
cloud software chain, and passes on some of the risk to a
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cloud service consumer. The CSP does not have control
over the physical cloud infrastructure it uses; for that, it
relies on a service offered by the CP.
• Cloud service consumer (CSC): End-user of a cloud
service. This party only consumes the cloud service and
has no control over the security of the infrastructure or
software behind the service.
Initial Evaluation: The roles we define are independent of the
service model. A single actor may take on multiple roles.
For example, a software development organization may use
Amazon EC2 to host its SaaS offering and thus act as a
CSP, but it may also use EC2 virtual machines for testing
purposes, thus taking the role of a CSC. Furthermore, it is
possible that in a given scenario, there is no CSP (as in
the case of a software development organization that uses
EC2 instances as test machines) or there are multiple CSPs,
potentially themselves acting as CSCs of other CSPs. The roles
we define are sufficiently flexible to classify actors in a variety
of cloud scenarios.
Our roles are similar to the “users” and “providers” de-
scribed in [16] and hold true to the model of the cloud
presented in that paper. Armbrust et al. [16] define a cloud
provider as an actor that makes cloud infrastructure avail-
able as a utility computing service. Amazon Web Services
is commonly classified as an IaaS provider and Microsoft
Azure and Google AppEngine are commonly classified as PaaS
providers; Armbrust et al. simply classify all three as cloud
providers. By their definition, the fundamental characteristic
of a cloud provider is the ownership and provision of the
cloud infrastructure in a pay-as-you-go manner, which is the
same definition we use for the CP role. In their model, cloud
infrastructures are used by SaaS providers, which in turn
provide services to SaaS users. We expand the roles defined
in their model in light of newer use cases for clouds to allow
CSPs to provide a service from any service model and to allow
CSCs to be direct users of CPs or CSPs, irrespective of the
service model. However, we stay true to the understanding
behind the roles, in that a CSP does not own the cloud
infrastructure and a CSC is an end-user of cloud services.
B. Cloud Architecture
In order to understand where to deploy monitors, it is
first necessary to identify the assets in the cloud that can
be monitored. To ensure that we identify the assets that are
commonly found in public clouds, we examine the cloud layer
by layer. Based on the work of the Cloud Security Alliance,
Spring identifies 7 layers of cloud computing within which
cloud assets can exist [2]. We have extended these layers by
separating the management and security infrastructure from
the other layers. The layers are listed below in bold, and their
assets are in italics. Figure 1 illustrates our cloud architectural
model.
• Facility: The physical infrastructure of the datacenters
that support the computing and networking hardware. This
layer includes the buildings, power supplies and backup
power infrastructure, control hardware and software, and
physical security hardware and software, such as CCTVs
and biometric authentication devices.
Fig. 1: Cloud architecture as reflected in our monitor deploy-
ment model. Shaded boxes represent ownership.
• Network: Within the datacenters, the network hardware
(e.g., switches, routers, and ToR switches) that routes
traffic within the datacenter. Network security hardware,
such as dedicated firewalls, IPS boxes, IDS boxes, and
network proxies, also falls in this layer. While the In-
ternet networking hardware responsible for routing traffic
between availability zones and between the datacenter and
consumers also falls within this layer, it is generally not
under the direct control of any of the cloud actors, so we
have excluded it from the list of assets.
• Hardware: Also within the datacenters, the servers that
contain the physical computing and storage hardware,
which include memory, CPU, HDD, and other peripherals.
• Operating System: The operating system and virtualiza-
tion software (virtual machine monitor), which include the
hypervisors and administrave domain (dom0) virtual ma-
chines running on the servers themselves and the operating
systems running on the client virtual machines.
• Middleware: The middleware located on the virtualization
software and operating systems running on the client
VMs. Middleware is software that interacts with cloud
applications and the virtual machine operating systems.
An example of middleware might be an enterprise service
bus that allows multiple cloud apps to communicate with
one another.
• Application: Software and services that run on the cloud
infrastructure.
• User: The end-user of cloud services. As the CSC and its
assets are outside the cloud, we exclude them from our
list of cloud assets. However, user data and computation
promised to a user by a Service Level Agreement (SLA)
both reside on the cloud and are assets that must be
protected.
• Management & Security: The software that is not visible
to the CSPs and CSCs but is nonetheless executed by
the CP to deploy, manage, meter, and protect the cloud
infrastructure. Examples of software in this layer include
cloud management and orchestration software and audit-
ing, monitoring, and security software. An attacker who is
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TABLE I: Table of cloud asset ownership.
Asset Owned by Layer
Buildings CP Facility
Power supplies and backup power
infrastructure
CP Facility
Control hardware and software CP Facility
Physical security hardware and
software
CP Facility
Network hardware CP Network
Network security hardware CP Network
Servers CP Hardware
Hypervisor CP Operating System
Administrative domain (dom0) CP Operating System
Client VMs CSP or CSC Operating System
Middleware CP, CSP, or CSC Middleware
Software and services CP or CSP Application
Data CSP or CSC User
Computation CSP or CSC User
Cloud management and orchestra-
tion software
CP Management & Security
Auditing software CP or CSP Management & Security
Monitoring software CP or CSP Management & Security
Security software CP or CSP Management & Security
aware of vulnerabilities in the management and security
software can cause loss of availability, confidentiality, or
integrity of the CP’s infrastructure and its consumers’ data
and services without needing to compromise assets in
other layers.
Further, in order to reason about monitor placement within
assets, we must identify for each actor the set of assets within
which the actor can independently place monitors (the assets
it “owns”). The relationship is important because actors can
directly deploy monitors only within the assets they control
through ownership. While it is sometimes possible for an actor
to monitor assets outside of its control through agreements
with other actors, we focus primarily on direct monitor de-
ployment. We briefly examine monitoring of unowned assets
in Section III-E.
In Table I, we identify the owners of cloud assets and the
layers in which they reside.
C. Cloud Threat Model
We motivate monitor deployment on cloud assets as a
mechanism to detect security breaches on those assets. To aid
in detection of security breaches, we first identify the threats to
the assets that each actor owns. Understanding which threats
are relevant to an actor’s assets can help the actor decide where
deploying monitors will most increase its chance of detecting
intrusions.
It is important to note that we do not attempt to identify the
specific vulnerabilities in the cloud assets, as these vary among
different hardware and software platforms and change with the
release of software patches and new versions. Practitioners can
use an understanding of the generic threats to their assets to
identify the specific vulnerabilities in their own instances of
the cloud, and can use this knowledge to drive the placement
and tuning of monitors in the cloud.
We now discuss security objectives for each of the actors
in our actor model in relation to the cloud assets that they own.
1) Cloud Provider: As the owner of the physical infrastru-
cure, the CP assumes all responsibility for its protection and
availability. The CP must ensure that the physical facilities
are available as per its SLAs, that access to the facilities
remains restricted to authorized parties, and that the infras-
tructure within the facilities is protected from malicious and
unintentionally harmful activity. The CP must ensure the con-
fidentiality, integrity, and availability of its network hardware,
network security hardware, and servers, ensure that network
traffic within the datacenter is not a source of data leakage or
attack, and ensure that access to computing resources is fairly
distributed among co-tenants.
The CP is also responsible for the protection of the virtual
assets it controls. It must ensure that the hypervisor and
administrative domain VM responsible for the virtualization
of cloud hardware are protected from attack and that they
do not behave maliciously as a result of compromise. If the
CP is providing its consumers with access to middleware
applications, it must also be concerned with the security of the
middleware applications. Furthermore, as the CP is responsible
for the physical storage of consumer data, it is partially
responsible for the protection of the data against leakage and
usurpation by malicious parties. It is also responsible for the
integrity and availability of the data.
In addition to its responsibilities to consumers, the CP must
ensure that it complies with federal regulations and laws. That
means it must audit the use of its cloud infrastructure, monitor
the cloud for illicit activity, and perform measures to ensure
data confidentiality and integrity as required by data privacy
laws. As the customers of the CP may be CSPs with their
own obligations to abide by regulations and laws, the CP must
also be able to provide audit information to its customers on
demand.
Table II lists the threats to each asset owned by the CP that
affect the CP’s security goals.
2) Cloud Service Provider: Since it cannot fully trust the
cloud infrastructure, the CSP must secure its resources from
attack from both outside and inside the cloud. It must ensure
that any operating system it is using is secured from attack,
both from outside attacks and from compromised virtualization
infrastructure. The CSP must also ensure that its middleware,
software, and services are available to its consumers, are
protected from attack or loss of integrity, and do not behave
maliciously. In addition, the CSP must ensure that its cus-
tomers get fair use of the software (e.g., it must prevent denial
of service or resource hogging).
In addition to its interest in the security of its own resources
on the CP’s infrastructure, the CSP must also be concerned
with the security of its clients’ data and computation per-
formed on the cloud. The CSP must ensure the security of
its consumers’ data from malicious parties both inside and
outside the cloud. That requires that the CSP take necessary
precautions to prevent threats due to vulnerabilities in the CP’s
data storage mechanisms.
As a business entity, the CSP, like the CP, must ensure
that it complies with laws and regulations, particularly in its
handling of customer data. Additionally, the CSP is interested
in ensuring that its SLA with the CP is being met. Thus,
the CSP must monitor its usage of cloud services, using both
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TABLE II: Threats to the cloud provider’s assets.
Asset List of threats
Buildings Natural disasters, man-made disasters (such as terrorism), power outages, unauthorized parties’ gaining of access to the datacenter
facilities.
Power supplies and backup power in-
frastructure
Power outages, bugs in failover code leading to improper response to power failures.
Physical security and control hardware
and software
Malicious insider tampering with the hardware, failure of or damage to hardware, exploitation of vulnerabilities in the software
or hardware.
Network and network security hardware External (D)DoS by way of network traffic blackholing or flooding, exploitation of vulnerabilities in networking hardware code,
unauthorized access to or malicious insider tampering with the hardware, improper physical care of hardware (e.g., poor cooling),
failure of hardware.
Servers Exploitation of bugs in cloud management software, unauthorized access to or malicious insider tampering with the hardware,
malicious hardware controller software, improper physical care of hardware (e.g., poor cooling), failure of hardware.
Hypervisor Exploitation of vulnerabilities in hypervisor code that can be exploited by tenant VMs, exploitation of covert channels.
Administrative domain Exploitation of vulnerabilities in dom0 OS, DoS of administrative functionality.
Middleware Exploitation of vulnerabilities in middleware code, improper security mechanisms used by developers of middleware, malicious
or deceptive middleware.
Client data Unauthorized access to data by malicious insiders, unauthorized access to data by outsiders who have taken control of data
storage hardware, data leakage due to improper destruction of old hardware, PATRIOT Act, confiscation of storage hardware by
the government, compromise of data availability by DoS, corruption of data due to faulty hardware, data leakage or corruption
during transit through the cloud infrastructure.
Client computation Theft of encryption keys stored in memory, leakage of client activity profiles through side-channels, unauthorized access to client
computation information through control of compute hardware (e.g., Blue Pill hypervisor rootkit) [17].
Cloud management, orchestration, and
security software
Exploitation of predictability in scheduling policies [18], externally visible covert channels, bugs in cloud management and security
software that could result in data leakage, unavailability of management software, downtime of cloud security or auditing software
(which could result in violations of laws/regulations or high risk to cloud infrastructure).
information acquired from the CP and its own observations,
to determine whether the CP is violating its SLA, and if it is,
whether to maintain its relationship with the CP.
Table III lists the threats to each asset owned by the CSP
that affect the CSP’s security goals.
3) Cloud Service Consumer: If a CSC acts as a direct
consumer of a CP’s services, it inherits some of the threats
associated with the CSP. If it has control over the operating
system being run on a client VM, it is responsible for the secu-
rity of the operating system against attack, both from outside
attacks and from compromised virtualization infrastructure. If
it controls or uses middleware, it must be concerned with the
secure execution of said applications.
As a consumer of a cloud service, the CSC’s primary roles
in security are to audit its provider to confirm adherence to the
SLA, and to verify the security of its own data and computation
as they are sent to and processed in the cloud. It can take steps
to protect the data in transfer and to ensure that the CP or CSP
is using encryption and access control to prevent unauthorized
use or tampering with the data on disk.
Table IV lists the threats to each asset owned by the CSC
that affect the CSC’s security goals.
D. Security-driven Monitor Deployment
We now motivate monitor deployment using our actor-
centric and asset-based cloud threat model.
Monitor deployment may have economic and computa-
tional resource costs, so it must be done efficiently. It may
cost money to purchase or support the monitoring software
or hardware, especially in the case of dedicated monitoring
hardware (such as an online network traffic monitor). Monitors
use computational resources that have a nontrivial power
cost, potential performance hit to production infrastructure.
Furthermore, the amount of data collected by monitors is
substantial, and there is a cost to store and analyze the data. In
addition, monitor deployment can increase the attack surface
of a system. Therefore, practitioners must selectively deploy
monitors to maximize their utility and minimize the risk
introduced by monitor deployment. We discuss considerations
that should be made in the following steps.
Step 1: The first step a practitioner should take in using our
monitor deployment model is to enumerate all assets under its
control and identify the specific versions of each asset. To
the extent possible, the practitioner should also identify the
versions of assets being used by its providers and consumers,
as awareness of threats to other actors can motivate deployment
of monitors. The practitioner should then figure out its system
architecture (i.e., the connections and relationships between
its assets and those of its providers and consumers), as a
compromised asset can be used as a platform for further
attacks.
Step 2: Once a practitioner has created a detailed picture
of its cloud system architecture, it should examine the list of
threats in the threat model in Section III-C and determine
which threats are applicable to its assets. For example, if a
CP utilizes network hardware that has known vulnerabilities,
then a threat that exploits one of those vulnerabilities may
be important and warrant targeted monitoring. Further, if the
practitioner offers a service that is known to be subject to
a particular type of attack, then more monitors should be
deployed to the assets that are directly affected by the attack
and can detect the attack early. For example, a CSP offering
software-as-a-service that is susceptible to (distributed) denial
of service ((D)DoS) attacks should deploy network traffic
monitors in front of its load-balancing service and analyze the
monitor data for the first signs of a DoS attack.
Step 3: Practitioners should also consider the importance
of an asset to the correct performance of the system or the
criticality of their mission. For example, if a government
agency uses the cloud to host its public website and also
to store and perform mission-related big data analytics, the
agency would likely consider placement of monitors on the
mission-related big data processing resources to be of much
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TABLE III: Threats to the cloud service provider’s assets.
Asset List of threats
Client VM Exploitation of a vulnerability in OS code by an outside party, an application running on the VM, or a malicious hypervisor or
dom0; improper allocation of physical resources by malicious or compromised VMM.
Middleware Exploitation of a vulnerability in software code by an outside party, another application running on the VM, or a malicious
hypervisor or dom0; improper security mechanisms used by developers of software; malicious or deceptive middleware or third-
party software.
Software and services Code injection, denial of service, exploitation of a vulnerability in application code, misbehavior or inadvertent damage by insiders
or administrators, loss of availability due to government confiscation of hardware associated with co-tenants’ illicit activity, loss
of security due to malicious or compromised VMM or OS, loss of availability due to CP’s loss of availability.
Client data Improper management of storage hardware by CP, leakage of data during transit between cloud and users, leakage of data during
transit within cloud, PATRIOT Act, confiscation of storage hardware by the government, leakage of data through covert channels
or mismanaged co-tenancy (shared memory, unauthorized access to disks), malicious or inadvertently harmful CP or CSP insider.
Client computation Theft of encryption keys stored in memory, leakage of client activity profiles through side-channels, unauthorized access to client’s
or own computation information through usurpation of provider’s or own resources.
Monitoring and security software Exploitation of predictability in usage of CP infrastructure, unavailability of management software, unavailability of security or
auditing software, misinformation provided by malicious or compromised CP management and security software.
TABLE IV: Threats to the cloud service consumer’s assets.
Asset List of threats
Client VM Exploitation of a vulnerability in OS code by an outside party, an application running on the VM, or a malicious hypervisor or
dom0; improper allocation of physical resources by malicious or compromised VMM.
Middleware Exploitation of a vulnerability in software code by an outside party, another application running on the VM, or a malicious
hypervisor or dom0; improper use of security mechanisms; malicious or deceptive middleware or third-party software.
Data Improper management of data security by CP or CSP, leakage of data from client machine, leakage of data during transit between
cloud and CSC, leakage of data through covert channels.
Computation Theft of encryption keys stored in memory, leakage of activity profiles through side-channels, unauthorized access to computation
information through usurpation of provider resources.
greater importance than the security of the website. Mission-
criticality analysis of assets would likely be done as part of a
risk analysis on the system.
Step 4: Additionally, practitioners should consider how they
will use the collected monitor data. Specifically, a practitioner
should deploy a monitor only if the value of the information
collected through the monitor outweighs the cost of purchas-
ing, deploying, and maintaining the monitor and analyzing
the data it collects. For example, network packet captures are
an information-rich monitoring mechanism. However, they are
extremely verbose and can become prohibitively expensive to
store. If a CP is simply attempting to detect inter-VM traffic
relationships, it would likely be better served with a ToR
switch- or hypervisor-level monitor that specifically tracks the
source and destination IP addresses of network flows.
Step 5: A practitioner must also consider how it can validate
the data produced by a monitor. It is important to realize
that the monitors themselves are subject to some of the same
threats as the remainder of the cloud infrastructure, and may
therefore be compromised and return bad data. For example,
consider a CP that places a system call monitor within the
hypervisor in its servers. If a zero-day exploit is used on
the hypervisor to install a rootkit that intercepts system calls
and returns fallacious results to tenant VMs, the system call
monitor itself will report fallacious data. The amount of trust
placed in a monitor becomes more important the higher in
the cloud stack the monitor is placed, as compromise of any
of the infrastructure at lower layers in the cloud can cause
compromise of the monitor.
There are a variety of approaches a practitioner could em-
ploy to validate monitor data. One such approach is to deploy
redundant monitors. Deploying multiple monitors that collect
similar information would allow a practitioner to corroborate
information collected by other monitors. Monitors should also
be deployed with some level of coverage in mind. In the
previous example of a compromised hypervisor, if the CP were
to place redundant monitors in assets in the layers surrounding
the hypervisor, such as an activity profile monitor in the
server hardware, it might be able to detect the discrepancies
between the reported system calls and the actual use of the
hardware, and detect compromises despite the failure of the
hypervisor monitor. In general, practitioners should consider
placing monitors in and around as many assets in their system
as possible. One primitive measure of coverage could be to
ensure placement of a monitor in each layer of the cloud.
E. Monitoring Unowned Assets
Often, it is also necessary to collect monitor information
from layers or assets not directly under one’s ownership. There
are multiple methods for performing such monitoring.
The most straightforward method for collecting monitoring
information from other actors’ layers is through a service
provided by the other actors. For example, users of Amazon
Web Services cannot directly monitor hardware-layer metrics,
such as CPU utilization, latency, and request counts, as they
do not have ownership of the hardware-layer assets. However,
through Amazon’s CloudWatch service, they can gain access
to those and other CP-controlled metrics [19]. Similar services
are also available for other providers [20].
Another method for such monitoring is through an agree-
ment made with the other actors. As part of its SLAs with
its providers or consumers, a practitioner could require that
its providers or consumers place monitors in certain locations
within their own cloud assets. While that method is contingent
on agreement by the external actor, it provides further control
over the exact information collected if a provider or consumer
does not provide its own monitoring service.
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1) Limitations of our monitor deployment model: The
intent of our ongoing research is to help practitioners to deploy
monitors in an efficient manner backed by practical concerns,
which are discussed here, and theoretical principles, which
are part of ongoing research. Our monitor deployment model
allows practitioners to inventory the vulnerabilities within
their cloud assets, which can motivate efficient deployment of
monitors so as to increase the chances of detecting an attack.
Although our model may help practitioners deploy mon-
itors relative to potential points of attack, our approach has
several limitations. We do not claim that our model will
keep a cloud system running in the presence of attacks. We
claim that the effectiveness of a deployed monitor depends
on the configuration of the monitor and on its ability to
detect exploitation of the vulnerabilities specific to an actor’s
cloud assets. Furthermore, although we envision our mon-
itoring system as a means to drive responses that support
intrusion tolerance, we do not provide recommendations for
these responses.
IV. APPLICATION
We illustrate the application of our monitor deployment
model with a scenario that is based on Netflix’s use of
Amazon Web Services to host its streaming video service.
Where possible, we use actual infrastructure and application
information given by Netflix in [21] and [22], but we take some
liberties in constructing the scenario. We also hypothesize
about the threats that might be relevant to each of the actors
in our scenario.
A. Scenario
In our example scenario, shown in Figures 2 and 3, a
streaming video service company, which we call StreamPics,
hosts its website, development operations, and streaming video
service on a private cloud. In order to reduce operating costs
and increase its service’s availability, StreamPics is planning to
migrate its services to a public cloud provided by CloudSpace,
an IaaS cloud provider. To start, StreamPics will deploy its
entire service in just one of CloudSpace’s cloud datacenters.
The actors in this scenario are CloudSpace, which is the CP;
StreamPics, which is the CSP; and StreamPics’s customers,
which act as CSCs.
CloudSpace’s datacenters have a three-tiered fat tree ar-
chitecture, with top of rack (ToR) switches making up the
bottommost tier. CloudSpace offers its consumers a compute
service, within which consumers can deploy virtual machines,
and a storage service, which implements a highly durable and
available key-value object datastore. The compute servers run
a Xen hypervisor with an Ubuntu LTS-based dom0, and each
server can host up to eight of CloudSpace’s smallest-sized
virtual machines. The storage servers provide a hardened API
that allows users to write, read, and delete objects. Compute
clusters and storage clusters within each datacenter reside
on separate racks, so communication between them passes
through higher-level switches. CloudSpace additionally pro-
vides its clients with access to a usage monitoring service for
their VMs and use of the storage service. Figure 2 illustrates
CloudSpace’s datacenter architecture.
Fig. 2: Architecture of CloudSpace’s cloud datacenter.
Fig. 3: Architecture of StreamPics’s cloud-based streaming
video service.
The storage service and compute cluster hypervisors use
ACLs to meter access. CloudSpace also uses hypervisor-level
firewalls to reduce the possibility of attacks by co-tenant VMs.
Network traffic within the datacenter is restricted through
the use of firewalls and configurable ACLs, and network
traffic with the outside Internet is run through signature-based
intrusion prevention systems (IPSes) that can be configured to
check for simple known attacks.
StreamPics uses both CloudSpace’s storage and compute
services to host its frontend website and backend streaming
service. All of its virtual machine images (VMIs) are a
custom version of Ubuntu that prevents SSH between virtual
machines, blocks all access into the virtual machine except
through a specific set of Web portals (e.g., customer portal and
development portal), and runs each process with a predefined
user ID and security group. The VMIs are preloaded with mon-
itoring and diagnostic software, a recent version of the Java
JDK, Tomcat Server, and an Apache management frontend.
No other software is allowed to run on StreamPics’s virtual
machines. StreamPics stores its data (video objects, logs, user
authentication information, etc.) in an at-rest encrypted format
using CloudSpace’s storage service with unencrypted keys.
It configures CloudSpace’s ACLs to restrict access to the
storage servers solely to compute VMs. Figure 3 illustrates
StreamPics’s service architecture.
StreamPics’s customers access the streaming service
through the customer portals running on StreamPics’s virtual
machines. Customers are assigned to customer portals through
a set of load-balancing servers. Each customer has a user ID
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and password that it uses to authenticate to the portals. Once
authenticated, customers can make application requests that
modify account information or stream a video to their client
device. When a customer requests a video stream, the customer
portal retrieves video data from the storage service, decrypts
it, and sends the video through an encrypted connection to the
client.
B. Application of Monitor Deployment Model
We can use our monitor deployment model to reason about
monitor deployment from the perspective of all three actors in
our scenario.
CloudSpace: CloudSpace owns the physical infrastructure up
to the virtualization software and the software that manages
the storage service. It owns the following assets:
• Facility: datacenter facilities, which include the build-
ing, generators, power supplies and failover mechanisms,
physical security mechanisms, and control software.
• Network: network switches, firewalls, and IPSes.
• Hardware: storage and compute servers.
• Operating system: hypervisors and dom0 VMs running on
the compute servers and host OSes running on the storage
servers .
• Application: storage service software.
• User: client data, identification information, and compu-
tation.
• Management & security: VM management and orchestra-
tion software, identity and access management software,
and host-level firewalls running on the compute servers.
At the facility layer, we assume that CloudSpace is pri-
marily concerned about power failures and unauthorized ac-
cess to the physical resources, and considers disasters to be
of low risk. We assume that its control and power supply
rooms house the majority of the security and management
software, so it considers the security of these rooms to be of
high importance. To increase the chances of detecting power-
failure-related incidents, CloudSpace could place monitors on
its generators to perform regular health checks and on its
failover mechanisms to detect anomalous behavior. Since such
incidents are likely to be rare, to minimize the cost of data
collection and analytics, the monitors should generate alerts
only upon anomalous behavior and report them directly to
administrators. To increase the chances of detecting unau-
thorized physical access, CloudSpace could place multi-factor
physical authentication devices on all datacenter entrances, and
additionally place such devices on entrances to the high risk
rooms. The monitors should generate alerts upon tampering,
access by unauthorized parties, and anomalous access patterns.
Anomaly-based monitors could also be placed on the manage-
ment software to monitor for issuance of anomalous commands
(such as a request for an unprecedented number of VMs) by
administrators or clients.
At the network layer, we assume that CloudSpace is
concerned that its network switches, some of which have
a known vulnerability that can cause the switch to crash,
may be attacked through the use of malicious packets. To
detect and potentially mitigate attacks on its network hardware,
CloudSpace could deploy signature-based IPSes in front of
its core switches and on the ToR switches coming from its
compute servers.
At the operating system and application layers, we assume
that CloudSpace is concerned about attacks on its storage
service from the outside Internet and malicious client VMs
and about attempts by malicious client VMs to compromise or
take control of the VMM. We assume that it has protections
within the hypervisor to fairly distribute access to resources,
so it is not concerned about DoS from within so long as the
hypervisor is not compromised. To aid in detection of VM at-
tempts to compromise the virtualization software, CloudSpace
could deploy a syscall monitor above the hypervisor layer,
and provide redundancy by deploying usage monitors on the
physical servers, an access log on the requests made to manage
the VMs, and, potentially, a usage monitor on the traffic to
the VMs. By correlating the information collected by those,
CloudSpace could identify intrusions or compromise to the
VMMs by detecting mismatches in the monitor data.
At the user layer, we assume that CloudSpace is concerned
about attacks on its storage service that aim to steal client
data. To increase its chance of detecting attacks on its storage
service, CloudSpace could log all access to the storage service.
To provide additional redundancy, CloudSpace could also place
IDSes on the switches connecting the storage cluster to the rest
of the datacenter.
StreamPics: StreamPics owns assets at the operating system
level and higher. Its assets include:
• Operating system: its client VMs and custom VMIs.
• Application and middleware: the platform and application
software that comprises its portals and streaming service.
• User: the data it stores in CloudSpace’s storage service.
At the operating system layer, we assume that StreamPics
is concerned that an attacker might gain the ability to execute
malicious software on its compute VMs through application
or operating system vulnerabilities. We also assume that it is
concerned about its dependency on the hypervisor owned by
CloudSpace and how a malicious or compromised hypervisor
could impact its compute VMs. Additionally, StreamPics is
concerned about DDoS attacks on its resources, but it can rely
on its SLA with CloudSpace, which stipulates that CloudSpace
will provide StreamPics with over 99.99% availability. To
increase its chances of detecting compromise of its compute
VMs, StreamPics could utilize CloudSpace’s usage monitoring
service to monitor for unusual activity and deploy anomaly-
based IDSes beneath its portal and streaming service. If
StreamPics cannot trust the output of CloudSpace’s usage
monitoring service, it could also deploy application-level heart-
beat monitors and usage monitors for redundancy. Further,
StreamPics could periodically monitor the contents its VMs’
memory to ensure that the software running in memory is only
the set of applications it has expressly permitted.
At the user layer, we assume that StreamPics is con-
cerned about unauthorized access to or corruption of the
data it stores in CloudSpace’s storage service. In particular,
it is concerned about theft of encryption keys and client
identification data and unauthorized use of video data from
inside or outside the cloud, which could violate its agreements
with content providers. To aid detection of such security
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breaches, StreamPics could enable access logging on its use of
the storage service or deploy anomaly-based monitors on its
application servers. While StreamPics cannot deploy monitors
within CloudSpace’s storage service, it could perform sporadic
attempts to access its data from anonymous, unauthorized
VMs or outside hosts to verify the validity of CloudSpace’s
protections and access logs.
StreamPics’s Customers: StreamPics’s customers also own
some of the resources in the user layer of the cloud. Their iden-
tification information is stored by StreamPics on CloudSpace’s
infrastructure, and their agreements with StreamPics provide
them with a level of availability to the streaming service. In
this scenario, StreamPics clients cannot deploy any monitors
directly within the cloud infrastructure. However, using our
recommendations, clients could use monitors provided by
StreamPics to their advantage. To detect violations of the
security and privacy of their identification information with-
out StreamPics’s cooperation, customers could examine their
reported usage of StreamPics’s service to detect anomalous
usage.
V. FUTURE WORK
Our monitor deployment model provides a framework that
practitioners can use to communicate and reason more effec-
tively about monitor placement within the cloud. However,
much work can still be done to build on our model.
We are investigating and formalizing a variety of metrics
for monitor deployment in our ongoing research. For example,
redundancy and coverage metrics could increase the trust
in collected monitor data and decrease the likelihood that
compromise of a subset of monitors would result in attacks
going undetected.
In addition, we want to evaluate monitor placement relative
to the utility of the data provided by that monitor. We want
to classify the statistical data types provided by monitors and
use that classification to formalize the concept of the utility
of monitor data streams. We also want to survey the types
of monitors that can be deployed in cloud systems, and by
coupling those results with the formalization of utility and the
metrics mentioned above, ultimately drive automated monitor
deployment.
Finally, in addition to security, we see other valuable
applications of our approach to monitor deployment. We want
to investigate a similar, asset-based approach to compliance-,
audit-, or performance-driven cloud monitor deployment. We
believe that such domains could benefit from a formalization
of the types of monitors that can be deployed and the data the
monitors can collect.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present an actor-centric and asset-based
model for monitor deployment that we claim provides parties
in the cloud with an easily actionable model for security-driven
deployment of monitors in the cloud. We argue that the current
literature does not provide such a model, as it focuses on the
cloud service models instead of on the actors in the cloud.
To explain the motivation for monitor deployment, we
define a set of three actors that are motivated by the need to
secure their cloud assets. Working layer-by-layer, we identify
the set of assets that exist in a cloud system and associate
them with the actors that control them. We then identify the
threats to those assets as seen by each actor, and provide
a methodology for deploying monitors in the cloud that is
based on the threat model we present. We illustrate the use
of our monitor deployment model with an example scenario
motivated by a real cloud use case.
In this paper, we present the results of our first steps to-
wards a larger goal: to develop a practical monitor deployment
model that is useful to practitioners seeking to satisfy their
security goals.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The authors would like to thank Jenny Applequist and
Carmen Cheh for their comments and revisions.
This material is based on research sponsored by the
Air Force Research Laboratory and the Air Force Office of
Scientific Research, under agreement number FA8750-11-2-
0084. The U.S. Government is authorized to reproduce and
distribute reprints for Governmental purposes notwithstanding
any copyright notation thereon. The views and conclusions
contained herein are those of the authors and should not be
interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or
endorsements, either expressed or implied, of the Air Force
Research Laboratory and the Air Force Office of Scientific
Research, or the U.S. Government.
REFERENCES
[1] Intel IT Pro Research, “Cloud security sur-
vey from Intel,” p. 31, 2012. [Online].
Available: www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/
reports/whats-holding-back-the-cloud-peer-research-report2.pdf
[2] J. Spring, “Monitoring cloud computing by layer, part 1,” IEEE Security
& Privacy, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 66–68, 2011.
[3] ——, “Monitoring cloud computing by layer, part 2,” IEEE Security &
Privacy, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 52–55, 2011.
[4] G. Aceto, A. Botta, W. De Donato, and A. Pescape`, “Cloud monitoring:
A survey.” Computer Networks, vol. 57, no. 9, pp. 2093–2115, 2013.
[5] S. Clayman, A. Galis, C. Chapman, G. Toffetti, L. Rodero-Merino,
L. M. Vaquero, K. Nagin, and B. Rochwerger, “Monitoring
service clouds in the future internet,” in Towards the Future
Internet. IOS Press, 2010, p. 115126. [Online]. Available: http:
//www.future-internet.eu/fileadmin/documents/valencia documents/
plenary/Monitoring service clouds in the Future Internet.pdf
[6] H. Khandelwal, R. R. Kompella, and R. Ramasubramanian, “Cloud
monitoring framework,” Tech. Rep., 2010. [Online]. Available:
http://www.cs.purdue.edu/homes/bb/cloud/h-report.pdf
[7] J. Gonzalez, A. Munoz, and A. Mana, “Multi-layer monitoring for cloud
computing,” in Proc. of 2011 IEEE 13th International Symposium on
High-Assurance Systems Engineering (HASE), 2011, pp. 291–298.
[8] D. Catteddu and G. Hogben, “Cloud computing: Benefits,
risks, and recommendations for information security,” European
Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA), Tech. Rep.,
2009. [Online]. Available: http://www.enisa.europa.eu/act/rm/files/
deliverables/cloud-computing-risk-assessment/at download/fullReport
[9] J. Brodkin, Gartner: Seven cloud-computing security risks, 2008.
[Online]. Available: http://www.idi.ntnu.no/emner/tdt60/papers/Cloud
Computing Security Risk.pdf
[10] NIST Cloud Computing Security Working Group, “NIST cloud
computing security reference architecture,” vol. 500, p. 204, 2013.
[Online]. Available: http://collaborate.nist.gov/twiki-cloud-computing/
pub/CloudComputing/CloudSecurity/NIST Security Reference
Architecture 2013.05.15 v1.0.pdf
9
[11] Cloud Security Alliance, “Security guidance for critical areas of
focus in cloud computing v3.0,” Cloud Security Alliance, Tech. Rep.,
2011. [Online]. Available: https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/guidance/
csaguide.v3.0.pdf
[12] D. Hubbard and M. Sutton, “Top threats to cloud computing v1.0,”
Cloud Security Alliance, Tech. Rep., 2010.
[13] S. Subashini and V. Kavitha, “A survey on security issues in service
delivery models of cloud computing,” Journal of Network and Computer
Applications, vol. 34, no. 1, pp. 1–11, 2011.
[14] C. Modi, D. Patel, B. Borisaniya, A. Patel, and M. Rajarajan, “A survey
on security issues and solutions at different layers of cloud computing,”
The Journal of Supercomputing, vol. 63, no. 2, pp. 561–592, 2013.
[15] US Department of Commerce and NIST, “Important actors for public
clouds,” Nov. 2010, important Actors for Public Clouds. [Online].
Available: http://www.nist.gov/itl/cloud/actors.cfm
[16] M. Armbrust, A. Fox, R. Griffith, A. D. Joseph, R. Katz,
A. Konwinski, G. Lee, D. Patterson, A. Rabkin, I. Stoica, and
M. Zaharia, “A view of cloud computing,” Communications of the
ACM, vol. 53, no. 4, p. 5058, Apr. 2010. [Online]. Available:
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1721654.1721672
[17] J. Rutkowska, “Subverting Vista kernel for fun and profit,” in
Black Hat Briefings, Tokyo, Japan, 2006. [Online]. Available:
http://www.orkspace.net/secdocs/Conferences/BlackHat/Asia/2006/
Subverting%20Vista%20Kernel%20For%20Fun%20And%20Profit.pdf
[18] T. Ristenpart, E. Tromer, H. Shacham, and S. Savage, “Hey, you,
get off of my cloud: Exploring information leakage in third-
party compute clouds,” in Proc. of the 16th ACM conference
on Computer and Communications Security (CCS ’09). New
York, NY, USA: ACM, 2009, pp. 199–212. [Online]. Available:
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1653662.1653687
[19] “Amazon CloudWatch,” 2014. [Online]. Available: http://aws.amazon.
com/cloudwatch/
[20] “Monitoring and autoscaling features for Windows Azure with
AzureWatch indepth,” 2014. [Online]. Available: http://www.paraleap.
com/azurewatch
[21] J. Chan, “Cloud security at Netflix,” Apr. 2012. [Online]. Available:
http://www.slideshare.net/jason chan/cloud-security-at-netflix
[22] A. Cockcroft, “Netflix global cloud architecture,” Oct. 2012. [Online].
Available: http://www.slideshare.net/adrianco/netflix-global-cloud
10
